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Review of Gary E. Varner, Personhood, Ethics and Animal 
Cognition: Situating Animals in Hare’s Two-Level 
Utilitarianism, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. xiv + 317 
Gary Varner, who used to be, like the current reviewers, an 
ethical biocentrist, now defends Harean prescriptivism, two-
level utilitarianism, and sentientism, and in this book applies 
these stances to animal ethics, as well as to ethical principles in 
general. As his Introduction discloses, Varner feels impressed 
by large areas of Richard Hare’s thinking, not least because 
much of it inspired that of Peter Singer. In this work Varner 
seeks to supplement the work of Hare and of Singer by 
discussing ethical principles appropriate to the treatment of 
animals, embodying his distinction between persons, near-
persons and sentient non-persons.  
Varner relates at the start of chapter 2 that he has been 
substantially convinced by Hare that universal prescriptivism 
entails utilitarianism (p. 26), and later introduces a formal 
argument in support of this conviction (pp. 38, 44-46). But Hare 
used to avoid claiming that normative conclusions were entailed 
by the logic of moral discourse, preferring to hold that universal 
prescriptivism ‘generates’ utilitarianism. (He did write of 
entailments between imperatives, but that is a different matter.) 
If he had endorsed the entailment view, then he would have 
 2
ceased to be a non-cognitivist; but he stubbornly persisted in his 
non-cognitivism throughout his life. 
As for Varner’s formal argument, nothing that he says 
overcomes the long-standing problem that Hare’s prescriptivism 
fails to cope with the problem of backsliding or weakness of 
will, and this makes the key premise concerning prescriptivity 
vulnerable. Meanwhile another key premise, which claims that 
the combination of universalizability and prescriptivity requires 
agents to review all and only the preferences of all the affected 
parties, is separately vulnerable, since it is unclear that interests 
are a function of preferences, or that creatures that lack 
preferences can be disregarded when the impacts of actions are 
considered, and this is relevant when one turns to impacts on 
animals. A further problem for the purported derivation of 
preference utilitarianism is that understanding another’s 
suffering need not involve making a prescription not to undergo 
such suffering oneself or not to inflict it on others, and need not 
involve adopting corresponding preferences either. (One of us 
has discussed these matters further (1).) 
Chapter 3 presents some interesting insights into the role of 
Intuitive-Level System rules and principles, which vindicate 
their general utility. In the next chapter, Varner presents an 
original argument in favour of Hare’s universal prescriptivism: 
if the moral language of humans embodied the features Hare 
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ascribes to it, then the use of such language would be adaptive, 
in an evolutionary sense (79f.). He recognises that Hare’s strong 
kind of prescriptivity is controversial because it is hard-pressed 
to account for moral backsliding, but presents this argument as 
weighing significantly as a counterpoise to that problem (82). 
But since human groups, with their use of moral language, have 
widely flourished in an evolutionary sense, and since strongly 
prescriptivist theories of that language conflict with the real and 
recurrent phenomenon of backsliding, it would be equally 
reasonable to argue that the use of moral language on the part of 
human groups is adaptive whether it complies with such theories 
or not. If so, Varner’s evolutionary argument collapses as a 
differential source of support for universal prescriptivism. 
However, Varner fares better, as the chapter proceeds, in citing 
empirical studies of moral judgement in support of Hare’s two-
level utilitarianism, and then in explaining how Hare could 
cogently address apparently hard cases for his normative theory. 
Part Two focuses on ‘the place of personhood’ in Harean 
utilitarianism (p.102). Chapter 5 gives detailed consideration to 
the argument for animal consciousness by analogy with human 
consciousness, but too readily credits the assumption that our 
knowledge of the consciousness of other persons is itself 
grounded in analogy, rather than in the fundamental concept of a 
person (without which, arguably, none of us could have 
knowledge even of our own consciousness). The chapter 
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proceeds to review, in the light of experimental evidence, the 
case for animal consciousness with regard to both the capacity 
for pain and the capacity for certain kinds of adaptive learning, 
adopting a Higher Order Thought theory of consciousness, and 
concludes that current research suggests that consciousness is 
found in vertebrates but in few if any invertebrates. However, 
the text too readily dismisses a First Order Representational 
(perception-responsive) theory of consciousness (which is 
nowhere near a ‘short step’ away from ‘panpsychism’ (p. 121)), 
and at times seems surprisingly indifferent to the painful or 
incapacitating experiments on whose findings it relies.  
Chapter 6, on ‘Personhood and Biography’ enlarges on Varner’s 
requirement that persons have a biographical concept of self, 
and on its probable absence in non-human animals. A problem 
here is its absence in large numbers of human beings, who are 
implicitly not persons at all (or, in the cases of pre-adolescent 
children, not persons yet: see p. 180). While there may well be 
more kinds and varieties of value in biographical lives than in 
ones with a non-biographical sense of self, the sense of self 
(‘autonoetic consciousness’ in Varner’s terminology) of itself 
has such significance as to suggest that, pace Varner, we should 
regard all its bearers as persons, including very nearly all human 
beings, including most children, and many non-humans too. 
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Relatedly, the conclusion of the next chapter that a good life for 
a person consists in living a good story (because humans are 
story-tellers) runs up against the difficulty that arguably it is not 
the achievement of just any story or life-plan that an individual 
selects for themselves that makes their life a good one. For there 
are other capacities that make us human, and the fulfilment of 
many (possibly most) of these is crucial to living well, whatever 
we choose to include in our ground-projects or central desires.  
Varner claims that persons, in their ability to develop a narrative 
story of their lives, have lives that are more morally significant 
than individuals that are not conscious of their own life story 
(see p.171, for example). However, even though animals are 
denied personhood on Varner’s view, one could argue that many 
possess capacities that enhance their conscious experiences; 
capacities that persons possess to a lesser degree. Such 
capacities could add moral significance to the lives of many 
animals, in a way that would not add moral significance to the 
lives of persons.  
In chapter 8 Varner discusses nonhuman candidates for near-
personhood (that is, for possessing autonoetic consciousness but 
lacking a biographical sense of self). In the light of empirical 
evidence, Varner assesses whether any animals have autonoetic 
consciousness, concluding that great apes, cetaceans, elephants 
and corvids are strong candidates for this status.  
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For Varner, the lives of persons are more morally significant 
than the lives of near-persons, and the lives of near-persons are 
more morally significant than those of merely sentient beings. 
Thus, it would also seem that, on Varner’s view, the lives of 
human near-persons would have less moral significance than the 
lives of persons, and, where humans are merely sentient, their 
lives would have less moral significance than the lives of human 
and nonhuman near-persons. As Varner is aware, his arguments 
appear open to the problem of marginal cases (see below).  
In Part Three, chapter 9, Varner discusses the view that animals 
are replaceable, presenting Hare’s utilitarian calculation in the 
context of slaughter-based agriculture. The pleasant lives of 
farm animals, together with the happiness derived from eating 
them, brings happiness into the world, and when such animals 
are replaced by ones that live equally pleasant lives then there is 
no loss in the total happiness (p. 231). Thus, farm animals are 
deemed replaceable, and slaughter-based agriculture is deemed 
justifiable because it increases the total amount of happiness in 
the world. One problem with this argument is that if animals 
live good lives, then to end their existence is to injure them (2). 
Moreover, it is not clear that the very facts that farm animals 
exist and live good lives can provide a justification for the 
practice that brought them into existence.  
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The problem of marginal cases is considered in detail in chapter 
9. If Varner wants to say that all marginal humans have an equal 
right to life as persons, whilst granting animals—with at least 
similar capacities to marginal humans—a lesser entitlement to 
such a right, then he has to provide a morally relevant reason 
that distinguishes such animals from marginal humans. 
(Otherwise, he can be accused of inconsistency or speciesism.) 
Varner supports two indirect reasons for giving marginal 
humans the same right to life as persons, whilst denying such a 
right to animals with at least similar capacities to marginal 
humans. One reason appeals to the personal relationships that 
people have with marginal humans (pp. 253-54); the other 
appeals to the fear that normal humans will experience if 
marginal humans are not granted the same moral status as 
normal humans: ‘we would be fearful of policies that cheapened 
the lives of marginal humans’ (p. 254). Yet many people have 
close relationships with animals and are deeply anguished by 
policies that treat animals as dispensable. Varner provides no 
direct reason to suppose that, at a critical level of thinking, the 
lives of marginal humans have equal moral status to the lives of 
normal humans.  
In the next chapter, Varner outlines some interesting proposals 
for achieving humane sustainable agriculture. Particularly 
interesting is the buffalo commons land-use plan (p. 275), which 
involves replacing cattle with buffalo (resulting in more 
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sustainable land use) and in-situ slaughter (a relatively humane 
method of killing animals). There is one proposal discussed by 
Varner that many readers might find problematic: the proposal 
to introduce blind chickens to intensive farms as a way of 
avoiding feather pecking. Contrary to Varner, the stance that we 
should change the housing system to fit the animals, not the 
animals to fit the housing system, need not assume that ‘only 
chickens like those already in existence should be brought into 
existence’ (p. 278). It could rather assume that the quality of the 
lives lived by chickens matters; that we are not entitled to 
manipulate animals in any way we please in order that they may 
better cope with the sufferings we inflict upon them; or that it is 
wrong to produce animals with more truncated capacities than 
they or other animals could have had. At least the first and last 
of these assumptions are consistent with total-view 
consequentialism. 
 
The final chapter compares a Harean utilitarian approach to 
animal ethics with Singer’s utilitarian approach, revealing that 
Singer’s arguments often invoke the distinction between 
intuitive and critical levels of thinking (pp. 284-86). Varner 
finds it surprising that Singer has not recognised a category of 
‘near persons’, arguing that Singer’s use of the metaphor of 
‘life’s uncertain voyage’ suggests a distinction between 
individuals that have an understanding of their life as a narrative 
 9
(‘persons’), and individuals that, while self-conscious, lack such 
an understanding (‘near-persons’) (pp. 287-88). However, even 
if Singer’s metaphor suggests such a distinction, the metaphor 
could indicate a sufficient but not necessary condition of 
personhood. Besides, Singer’s central definition of ‘person’ 
would not call for such a distinction. Towards the end of the 
chapter, Varner shows that while Singer advocates 
vegetarianism, his utilitarianism actually permits humane-based 
agriculture (pp.288-89).  
 
Overall, in spite of its problems, this interdisciplinary book 
makes a valuable addition to the literature on animal ethics, for 
while Hare did not systematically apply his two-level 
utilitarianism to animal issues, Varner shows how intuitive level 
rules and critical thinking can function in their regard. The book 
will interest those who are familiar with the animal ethics 
debates, and will be a valuable read for philosophers interested 
in utilitarianism (whether from a Harean perspective or more 
generally), in ethical issues involving personhood, and/or in 
sustainable agricultural practices.  
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